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The Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist) surprisingly won the majority of the vote across 
Nepal, even in the Tarai districts where former Maoist People’s Liberation Army (PLA) 
commanders have formed armed opposition groups and seemingly have some influence and 
control.  Most pundits and international observers give this election the thumbs up—
perhaps not necessarily as free and fair, but at least credible.  However, there are pieces 
missing from this puzzling victory.   
 
For 15 months before the election I traveled throughout Nepal as an international observer, 
reaching more than 30 of the 75 districts, often by foot, traveling from village to village in 
remote roadless areas.  In these areas most people were still afraid of the Maoists, as they 
were fearful that the Maoists would once again take up arms.  They claimed “psychological 
fear” from the continued presence of the same PLA and Maoist militia who had been based 
in their villages during the war, but now operating under the guise of the Young Communist 
League (YCL).  Before the elections, when I asked villagers how they would vote most had 
no idea, but all said they wanted “peace.”   
 
In remote villages often the only political party present was the CPN(M), specifically the 
YCL cadre.  Other political parties based in distant District Headquarters (DHQ) often 
stated that they could not venture out into villages, because if they did the YCL would beat, 
abduct, or kill them.  In some cases the members of these other parties just found it a 
convenient excuse to claim that it was the YCL keeping them from campaigning or doing 
any sort of social service in hard-to-reach villages.  It is difficult to decide which has greater 
weight and often varied with location. 
 
Three days before the Constituent Assembly Election my team partner and I flew by 
helicopter to a remote area of Rukum district, near the Dolpa border.  Rukum, along with 
Rolpa, is the notorious origin of the CPN(M)’s People’s War, which began in 1996 and 
ended with nearly 13,000 people killed during the ten year war.  In the days before the CAE 
most villagers we spoke with still had no idea of how they would vote, most said that their 
village leader would make the decision for them.  However, also during this time there were 
large numbers of YCL roaming about in the villages.  Some were local, but we were told that 
many had come from “outside.”  The YCL were easily identified, wearing CPN(M) red 
hammer and sickle t-shirts and track suits with “Young Communist League” written in 
Nepali on the back.  Often they were walking as an army would, with lathis (sticks, also used 
by the armed police), seeming to survey the perimeter of the village.  Low-level YCL proudly 
told us they had gone door-to-door to collect the names of registered voters absent from the 
village.  They found almost one-third of residents were absent and would not be voting.  
YCL commanders, most likely former PLA, were also out and patrolling.  They used VHF 
radios to communicate with other commanders based in nearby polling locations.  
 
On Election Day all appeared fine at the first polling location we visited.  However, while 
leaving, about 200m down the trail, we met 20 YCL with copies of voters lists who were 
stopping each person on their way to vote.  We saw the YCL ask people for their names and 
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if their names were not on the list the YCL gave them a new name to use, that of an 
absentee voter from the names they had earlier collected.  They were also showing each 
voter where to stamp the ballot for the CPN(M).  When we asked what they were doing they 
told us they were “helping to save time at the polls” by checking off names on the voters 
lists and giving each voter “the correct information” on a slip of paper to give to the official 
polling staff.  
 
At all of the polling locations we visited it felt as if the polling staff were under YCL 
intimidation and had come to some sort of “don’t ask don’t tell” deal with the YCL.  The 
identification officer never asked for or checked identification, and if the officer had been 
local and personally knew everyone who was coming to vote then maybe they would have 
had an idea of who was actually voting.  However, not one of the polling officials were local, 
all were brought in from different districts.  When they needed to verify someone’s identity 
they asked the CPN(M) party representative for verification.  At one polling location 
obviously under CPN(M) control, as it was surrounded by YCL holding red painted lathis 
and had a team of YCL inside the polling location checking voter’s names (and again 
assigning new names when the person was not listed on the voters list), we asked the YCL 
why they had surrounded the polling location and they replied “for security.”  When we 
asked the polling staff about the YCL they denied they were YCL, instead saying they were 
“local volunteers.”  When we asked these “volunteers” who they were in front of the polling 
staff they proudly stated, “we are YCL!”  The polling officials only shrugged in response.  A 
few hours walk away at another polling location a number of local residents and a domestic 
election observer told us that earlier in the day the polling staff had to shut the polling 
location for an hour because the YCL had taken over and stuffed over 100 ballots into the 
box.  However, when we asked the polling officers about this they said, “there have been no 
problems.”  After the election we learned of a village—just an hour’s walk away from where 
the YCL had told us that they had collected names of absentee voters and found that about 
one-third of registered voters were absent—where every single registered voter had voted, 
100 percent turnout.  That means that not a single person had left to work in Kathmandu, 
was sick, died, or had gone abroad, a rare situation for the villages of Nepal. 
 
When we first arrived in Rukum, three days before the election, we met a group of Nepali 
Congress (NC) supporters who had not been back to their village in five years, since being 
displaced by the Maoists during the People’s War.  They told us that had returned to vote 
and were very happy to be back.  The day after the election we happened to meet them again 
on the trail, but they told us that they had not voted as they and 14 other NC supporters had 
been abducted by the YCL the morning of the election and were held until the election was 
over.  Later, in the DHQ, we met ten United Marxist Leninists (UML) supporters who had 
the same experience—though their abduction was more violent, as the YCL held kukuris 
(large knives) to their throats, tied their arms behind their backs and forced them to lie with 
their faces in the dirt all day, until it was too late for them to vote. 
 
On the second day after the election, late in the night, the last ballot boxes coming from far-
flung corners of Rukum arrived in the DHQ, after being walked in accompanied by armed 
and temporary police.  After all the boxes arrived the Chief Returning Officer (who holds 
ultimate authority for the district) stated that the counting would begin after an “all party” 
(in this case representatives of the three largest parties with candidates competing in Rukum) 
meeting at 7am the next morning.  However, the NC and the UML representatives 
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demanded that the CRO officially register their complaints against the CPN(M) for voter 
fraud and intimidation with the Central Election Commission before any counting began.  In 
response the CRO stated that this issue would be discussed at the 7am meeting.  The next 
morning we arrived at the election office at 6am, only to find the election officers and the 
CPN(M)’s national second in charge, and also a candidate for Rukum, already engaged in 
discussion.  They seemed very surprised to see us and told us the meeting was private.  
When we asked where the other parties were they stated, “Oh . . . they are still coming.”  An 
hour later they arrived, as they were told to arrive at 7am.   During the group meeting it 
appeared as if the election officers had made a deal with the CPN(M), as they sided with the 
CPN(M) and stated that the counting must begin immediately and that there was no time for 
complaints to be formally registered with the CEC (which would have only taken the time of 
a fax).  When the UML and NC pressed harder the election officials stayed quiet, but the 
CPN(M) leader began shouting back, “the election is over and counting must begin 
immediately.”  We were not able to witness the rest of the meeting as our helicopter arrived 
before any deal was reached, but we were later informed that the NC and UML’s complaints 
were not registered and the counting started that evening.  The CPN(M) won Rukum.  I 
estimate that the CPN(M) stole as much as 30% of the vote in my area of observation, 
through voter impersonation, intimidation, and outright abduction of those known to 
support other parties.  Why did the Maoists feel the need to use intimidation, violence, and 
impersonation in an area notoriously known as a Maoist stronghold?   
 
Throughout 2007 the majority of people I interviewed believed that the YCL would use 
secret cameras and binoculars on E-Day to watch how they voted and if they did not vote 
Maoist the YCL would punish them.  Why bother using intimidation on E-Day when most 
rural voters already feared YCL punishment?  Also, if intimidation was blatant in Rukum was 
it the same everywhere outside of the easy-to-reach polling locations?  International election 
observers primarily stayed within a two-hour radius (driving or walking) of any DHQ, but 
across much of Nepal many polling locations were a day or a week’s walk away from the 
DHQ.  Also, why did the government polling staff cooperate with the CPN(M)?  Obviously 
the polling staff were greatly out numbered by the YCL on E-Day, but why let the problems 
they encountered by the YCL go unmentioned once they were back in the DHQ and had 
safety in numbers? 
 
Yo naya Nepal ho?  This is a new Nepal?  Many Nepalis living in Kathmandu have since told 
me that they voted for the CPN(M) to vote for change.  Before the elections the interim 
government, led by the NC, had been worse than dreadful so a change in leadership was the 
key issue for most voters in Kathmandu, where the affect of the central government is 
actually felt, unlike rural Nepal.  Hopefully the CPN(M) can at least achieve this level of 
incompetence.  But, there are many unanswered questions remaining and that the CPN(M) 
possibly have unfairly “won” the elections may predict how they will govern, which could be 
a lot like the old Nepal or possibly worse. 
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